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A major challenge for the Rural Housing Service (RHS) is to preserve the stock of 
affordable multifamily housing in its 515 program. Most of these apartments were built 
during the 1970’s and 80’s. In general, government programs for low-income family 
housing have proven to be more effective in producing an available supply than in 
maintaining it over the long-run. Over the life of the program 527,089 apartment units 
were produced. New production has been very slight during the past decade while the 
supply of apartments affordable to rural low-income families is declining, as is evident by 
the fact that about 431,000 units remain. Without effective preservation programs, RHS’s 
515 stock of housing will continue to decrease, and many families will be displaced from 
the homes they rent in the coming years.
2   
  The term “preservation” is used by RHS and affordable housing advocates to 
mean preventing 515 properties from becoming either market-rate rental apartments that 
displace low-income families or tear-downs for alternative uses of the land. The 
disappearance of low-income housing typically happens when the investor syndicates that 
developed the 515 buildings seek to get out of the program by prepaying their loans, or 
ultimately when their 40- or 50-year loans are fully amortized.  In other words, 
preservation refers to retaining properties for low-income housing, whether preventing 
either conversions to market-rate rental units or losses due to physical deterioration.  
  Conversions have been a more prevalent source of decline in the 515 stock but 
physical deterioration is projected to be an increasing problem due to insufficient long-
term maintenance and inadequate financial reserves for rehabilitation.
3 Some of the 
investor syndicates are caught in a situation where they cannot afford to prepay because 
of high exit taxes, so they stay in the program without economic incentives and financial 
resources for either preventive maintenance or rehabilitation of apartment buildings.
4  
  When a resource is insufficiently maintained, economists often look for an 
explanation in flawed delineation of property rights. Many types of property have 
attributes that can be delineated by a bundle of rights. Barzel points out how an initial 
allocation of all rights to one owner, perhaps a buyer or developer, will become 
unbundled and assigned to other stakeholders when their utilization and care of 
corresponding attributes of the total property can be more efficient.
5  
                                                           
1 The author’s opinions expressed in this paper do not represent or reflect USDA views or policies. 
2 Leslie Strauss, “Overview of the Section 515 Program,” Preservation of Affordable Rural Housing: A 
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  In dealing with public housing programs, proponents of privatization might argue 
that the problem is the unbundling, specifically, the regulation of certain rights by 
government. Full privatization of 515 properties would likely improve their long-term 
maintenance but they would not be preserved for use as affordable housing. Hence, some 
optimal reassigning or reconfiguring of property rights to the 515 portfolio can improve 
the trade-offs between preserving affordability and preserving the value of multifamily 
housing by maintaining or improving their physical condition.  
Such a proposal involves assigning more of the bundle of rights in 515 apartments 
to the people who live in these places. Especially important is the right to capture transfer 
value, which can be coordinated and managed by cooperatives. The underlying idea is to 
provide opportunity for some increase in wealth for low-income families as an incentive 
for them to pursue property improvement and long–term maintenance. Note that this 
strategy is not appropriate for the lowest-income families who are in some cases 
operating only with rent subsidies.  This paper outlines a strategy of converting 
ownership in 515 projects from a landlord system to housing cooperatives.  
Limited equity cooperatives (LECs) have been the form of cooperation used for 
affordable housing policy.  This paper departs from that tradition by proposing the use of 
the market-rate cooperative (MRC) as having the property rights assignment needed to 
achieve efficient long-term maintenance of 515 properties. LECs vary by the extent to 
which they pass on increases in share value for a transfer of membership and turnover in 
apartments.
6 But the LEC model involves costly appraisals and complicated calculations 
of a neighborhood’s affordability-constrained share price. By contrast, an MRC uses the 
market price. The market provides a clear signal to the membership, rather than having 
the value of their membership share subject to uncertain adjustments with price or cost 
indices.  
In rural real estate markets, MRCs for low-income families are unlikely to cause 
rapid price escalation as is more likely to occur in urban markets. A 515 MRC would 
operate under Federal Government regulations. For example, members of the cooperative 
would not be allowed to immediately vote for a sell-out to a for-profit developer. Other 
regulations that would need to accompany a 515 MRC are considered in the last section 
of this paper. Under current 515 regulations, only LECs that strictly maintain 
affordability are permitted, and therefore no real returns on member shares are allowed.
7  
The alternative proposed in this paper would in the long-run make the affected 
apartments unaffordable for new tenants who are in the lowest income status. But more 
affordability for other low-income families would occur by gaining improved quality and 
maintenance of the housing stock, even though particular units may not stay committed to 
serving the very lowest income strata. However, the total savings of this process would 
justify new funding for those families in the lowest income status.  
  Another benefit is that returns on housing cooperative equity, paid only for 
appreciation derived from property improvements, are a superior method for personal 
savings. Property appreciation often functions better than other savings methods that 
require individuals to make continuous saving versus spending decisions. Cooperative 
                                                           
6 Herbert H. Fisher, “The Role of Limited Income Maximums,” A Collection of Articles from the 
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housing equity can be an effective institutional mechanism for personal savings, and at 
the same time accomplish physical preservation of low-income housing.  
  Some background on RHS’s 515 program, its preservation problems, and the 
methods used to solve them are described. A restricted MRC model, based on the 
economics of property rights is presented, along with a discussion of how these ideas 
could be implemented in the 515 program.  
 
Review of the 515 Program 
  The involvement of USDA in housing goes back to the New Deal era, but while 
the commodity price support programs were sustained, most rural development programs 
were terminated for several years before gradually reemerging.  In the Housing Act of 
1949, which initiated much of the public housing programs in the U.S., Title V 
established the 515 multifamily housing loan programs for use by farmers and 
administered by the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA).  In 1961, Title V was 
amended to allow non-profit organizations and state and local public housing agencies to 
receive 515 loans. Similar to FmHA’s lending practices to farmers, these agency 
borrowers have to show that loans could not be obtained elsewhere. Furthermore, 
borrowers were encouraged to refinance in the future as other credit opportunities 
developed for them, so that they would graduate to more financial independence in the 
commercial market.
8 
  Public subsidization of rural multifamily housing became significant with the 
Housing Act of 1968 that offered 515 loans at 1 percent for 40- and in some cases 50- 
year terms with only 5 percent equity or down-payment required. In addition, since 1978 
the 515 program has been supplemented by a rent subsidy for low income tenants who 
would otherwise pay more than 30 percent of their income for housing. The RHS rent 
subsidy is similar to the section 8 program provided by Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD). In other words, the housing project loan is subsidized, as well as the cash flow 
from tenants’ rent subsidies to pay back the loan and operating expenses. Subsidies have 
provided a way to get this public service produced, but long-term preservation of these 
homes for low-income families has been a different and more difficult challenge. 
  Preservation problems in regard to 515 loan prepayments only developed once the 
program was opened to for-profit developers in 1972. Changes in the tax code had 
already created opportunities for tax syndicates or partnerships to participate in programs 
like the 515. The broadened participation in 515 was successful in increasing the supply 
of affordable housing to low income families in rural areas. In fact, program volume 
increased from $40 million in 1972 to $105 million in the following year and reached 
$881 million by 1980.  Figure 1 shows this expansion in terms of units produced. 
 
                                                           
8 Arthur M. Collings, Jr., “Rural Rental Housing Preservation: The FmHA Experience,” Housing Policy 
Debate, The Fannie Mae Foundation, V. 2, Issue 2, 1991, 559 and 562. 
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  There were two policy decisions with regard to the expansion of the program to 
for-profit syndicates that have proven to be costly.
9 First, FmHA acted on it’s principle of 
encouraging a borrower to graduate to commercial sources of credit so that the right to 
prepay 515 loans was not restricted at that time. Second, FmHA did not place use-
restrictions on prepaid 515 properties to forbid displacement of low-income tenants. Note 
that such restrictions had never been needed before 1972, when lending was unavailable 
to for-profit developers. Once the tax benefits begin to decline, syndicate partners have 
an incentive to get the 515 properties off their books because the return on their equity, 
their capital contribution, in these projects was limited to 6%, although in recent years it 
has been increased to 8%. After being prepaid, the apartment buildings can be converted 
to market based rentals, which drives out many of the low-income tenants. 
  By 1978 prepayments and tenant displacements were in full swing. In the 
following year affordable housing advocates were able to convince Congress to have 20- 
or 15-year use restrictions on future 515 loans initiated after December 21, 1979. It also 
retroactively applied use restrictions to apartment buildings with more than 10 units, 
which blocked prepayment plans of many investor partnerships on projects they had in 
the 515 program from the early 1970s.  Predictably, in less than a year, housing 
developers convinced Congress to repeal the retroactive part of the 1979 public law.   
  The Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 (referred henceforth as 
the Preservation Act) restored the retroactive provisions for 515 loans prior to 1979 if it is 
determined that proposed properties for prepayment were located where housing markets 
for low-income families were already in short supply or would adversely affect housing 
opportunities for minorities. If either were the case, however, those requesting 
prepayment are offered additional incentives to stay in the program, such as generous 
equity loans or commitment to allow a higher rate of return when they exit the program at 
a later date. If these incentives are not enough, the Preservation Act requires investor 
partnerships to seek out transfers to either non-profit organizations or public housing 
agencies. If such transfer offers prove unsuccessful, then prepayment is approved.
10 
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  The 1987 Preservation Act essentially established the major ways to retain the 
stock of 515 affordable housing, either giving incentives to forestall prepayment or 
making transfers either to non-profits or local housing agencies. In 1989 Congress 
restricted payments on all 515 loans made after December 15 of that year. It was around 
that time that 515 expenditures were leveling out at around $550 million, and have 
remained at or below $100 million since 1995.  Figure 1 shows this pattern in terms of 
units produced with 515 funds. But in 1992 in an effort to help the cause of affordable 
housing, new legislation applied the pre-1979 requirements of the Preservation Act to the 
mortgage loans initiated between 1979 and 1989. While affordable housing advocates 
would have liked to have had these restrictions from the start, they presumably believed 
that a retroactive imposition of regulations was better than none. 
  The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has been sued numerous times over 
the retroactive restrictions imposed by Congress on prepayment of 515 loans. Some of 
the court decisions have gone against USDA.  Of course, many 515 prepayments occur 
entirely within the regulations. Many of them result in transfers of multifamily housing to 
non-profits or housing authorities that retain the tenants and maintain the affordability of 
these apartments. The failure of preservations due to transition to market prevailing rents 
typically occurs in rural markets that have a relatively high demand for multifamily 
housing.   
  The tax benefits that were syndicated in 515 partnerships were changed by the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986. The use of accelerated depreciation was restricted and this 
incentive for participation in 515 projects was replaced by the Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit (LIHTC). The LIHTC has helped to encourage investors to participate and stay in 
the 515 program.  In fact, some non-profit organizations have developed creative ways to 
coordinate transfers of 515 properties from for-profit partnerships and use LIH tax credits 
to finance apartment rehabilitation. 
11 
Figure 2 shows the difference between new 515 units produced and units prepaid 
from 1999-2004.  Over this six-year period, units prepaid exceeded those produced by 
880 and were especially lopsided in the past two years. But this difference does not 
precisely measure the status of preservation because some prepays, though a small 
percentage, continue as affordable housing. More critical to the future of preservation are 
units not prepaid that are vulnerable to being lost when physical deterioration renders 
them uneconomical to rehabilitate.   
  The 515 loans that are eligible for prepayment but not prepaid are staying in the 
program because of an exit tax.
12 Prior to the 1986 tax reform, accelerated depreciation 
allowed properties to be fully depreciated. A syndicated partnership is liable for exit taxes 
when more depreciation has been claimed than is available in equity.
13  These cases are a 
lost opportunity for ownership turnover that would accomplish rehabilitation to preserve 
affordable housing.  
 
                                                           
11 LISC, 10 and 17. 
12 LISC, 12, and Colleen M. Fisher, “Preservation and the Aging Portfolio: The Owners’ Perspective,”     
HAC, 19. 
13 General Accountability Office, Multifamily Rural Housing: Prepayment Potential and Long-Term 
Rehabilitation Needs for Section 515 Properties, GAO-02-397, May 2002, 10, and HAC 4-5.   6
 
 
  Prepayment controversies and the related issue of preservation strategies have 
been extensively debated and studied. Various solutions such as debt forgiveness and exit 
tax relief are being advocated. A more recently emerging concern is the potential cost of 
physical deterioration of the 515 portfolio. RHS contracted with a consulting firm to do a 
property assessment and its findings and recommendations were completed in the fall of 
2004.
14 This study found that many properties were on the verge of needing significant 
rehabilitation but lack sufficient current reserves and provision for future reserves to 
finance the impending physical upkeep. RHS responded with an Administrative Notice, 
AN 4036, to provide combinations of debt relief, RHS loans, and third party financing for 
revitalization demonstration projects that will serve as a guide to future programs for 
rehabilitating the 515 portfolio.  
  A strategy of organizing housing cooperatives to preserve the affordability status 
of multifamily housing has not been officially proposed as a part of government, RHS, 
strategy for its 515 portfolio. Participation by cooperatives was permitted in the 1961 
revisions of 515. However, many of the weaknesses in the 515 program that have limited 
cooperative involvement were studied for RHS in 1999, but no actions have been taken to 
make revisions.
15 Yet, a mutual housing association model for collecting a significant 
portfolio of 515 properties for preservation is being pursued by the National Cooperative 
Bank (NCB). The use of mutual housing systems with more flexibility in the transfer 
value of member equity is one of several regulatory revisions that might increase 
cooperative involvement in the preservation of the 515 stock of multifamily housing.  
 
Housing Cooperatives 
  The proposed strategy for preserving affordable housing in the 515 program 
combines two institutional mechanisms: (1) property rights reassignment, and (2) housing 
                                                           
14 Property Assessment. 
15 Anne Reynolds and Hugh Jeffers, An Assessment of Loan Regulations for Rural Housing Cooperatives 
(research conducted for USDA/RD/Cooperative Programs), September 1999. 
(www.wisc.edu/uwcc/info/i_pages/house.html) 
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cooperatives. A reassignment involves some government de-regulation so that individuals 
may hold unencumbered rights that create incentives to prevent the gradual physical 
deterioration of property over a long-term horizon. Specifically, restrictions on paying 
returns on share equity of departing members might be revised to this end. Both 
cooperatives and property rights have self-regulatory mechanisms that can be more 
flexible substitutes for some government rules.  However, either mechanism by itself is 
not as effective for the goal of affordable housing preservation as they are if working in 
combination. 
  The proposal in this paper calls for a form of regulated MRC; however, the role of 
cooperatives in the housing affordability movement has entirely involved LECs, located 
primarily in big cities. A review of LEC policy provides a guide and rationale for 
developing new policies for a regulated MRC.  
  The LEC is designed for implementing affordable housing policies, whether 
under the regulations of government programs or independent of them. LECs that are not 
participating in the RHS and HUD affordable housing programs voluntarily limit the 
transfer value of member equity when there is turnover in family housing units. Yet, 
these independent LECs often raise the price on sales of new membership shares in 
accordance with their determination of affordability levels in their neighborhood. Many 
of these independent LECs would also be out of compliance with other RHS regulations 
in regard to policies for member selection and approval. These regulations inhibit the 
self-regulatory functioning of housing cooperatives. 
16 
  The general model of housing cooperatives is based on members owning shares in 
a cooperative that entitle them to the rights of occupancy of apartments. A blanket 
mortgage for financing all individual units is held by the cooperative. New members buy 
equity shares in the cooperative and are assessed a monthly carrying charge for operating 
expenses and their proportionate share of the blanket mortgage payment, including 
property taxes. Members are eligible to deduct their share of mortgage interest and 
property taxes from their individual income taxes. Also, similar to a home equity loan, 
cooperative members can receive share loans and deduct interest expense from their 
taxable income. 
  Similar to owners of a residential unit in a condominium, cooperative members 
have bought rights to participate in the democratic governance of the association and to 
be bound by its rules. Members can be involved through a democratic process with, for 
example, developing and implementing ideas for improving the commons area. They also 
have a vote and voice through their board of directors regarding actions that have some 
affect on operating costs, and hence their monthly charges. These rights are a part of the 
bundle that is assigned to members that is unavailable to rental tenants. 
  The affordability of cooperative housing is determined by the price of an equity 
share and the monthly carrying charges. LECs are committed to keeping housing 
affordable for low income families in their communities. Limited equity means that even 
when housing properties rise in value, which is captured in a cooperative’s equity, the 
offering of a new share price may only adjust in line with some type of affordability 
index for low income families.
17  LEC provision of affordable housing is an example of 
                                                           
16 Ibid, 17-25. 
17 Herbert H. Fisher, op cit.   8
cooperative principles, functioning as a constraint, to produce a local public good.
18 This 
capability forms a natural alliance with the housing objectives of RHS and HUD. 
  LECs have the potential to not only keep housing affordable, but also to provide 
excellent care and maintenance. In other words, there are numerous examples, mostly in 
urban neighborhoods, of LECs that successfully reconcile the potential goal-conflict 
between affordability and long-term physical preservation of apartments. However, their 
efficacy in this regard is dependent upon having a core majority of members who want 
long-term residency and strong community ties. In fact, the focus of the LEC is the 
resident community, the members who stay for a long time, and no incentives are created 
to depart.   
  The difference between the rationale of the proposal in this paper and traditional 
LEC policy hinges on the definition of “member.” In an LEC, the user-benefits principle 
is at work. A departing member is paid slight, if any ex post rewards for ex anti 
contributions or improvements to the cooperative property. Member benefits are 
predominantly confined to current users, and to future users in regard to having housing 
affordability maintained for them. Sound fiscal management for an LEC is described by 
one of the leading experts in housing cooperatives as follows. “…the cooperative can 
usually build its income or reserves by charging incoming members something more than 
it pays outgoing members because the increases in value of the shares are due at least in 
part to the efforts of the cooperative and its members.” 
19 
  The above quotation points out that efforts made by departing members to 
increase the value of shares are not fully, if at all, compensated. The members who matter 
are the members who continue to reside in the cooperative. By contrast, the proposal of 
this paper assumes that an MRC, requiring a minimum period of residency before 
departing members are eligible to receive a return on equity, would provide an 
intertemporal incentive. The latter is defined as an incentive for current members to 
increase their efforts to improve the housing cooperative for the future, even when they 
are not planning to have long-term residency.  
 
Cooperative Equity Incentives 
  The idea of using returns on equity as incentives for cooperative members 
emerges whenever a long-term maintenance issue is viewed through the lens of property 
rights economics.
20 From this viewpoint, overt government regulations will often not be 
fully successful in accomplishing tasks such as care and upkeep of subsidized housing. 
The history of the 515 program would not contradict such predictions.  
                                                           
18 Bruce J. Reynolds, “Cooperative Principles as Constraints for Public Goods Production,” NCR-194, 
December 2000 (www.agecon.ksu.edu/accc/ncr194/ncr%20publications.htm). 
19 Herbert J. Cooper-Levy, “An Introduction to Limited Equity Cooperatives,” A Collection of Articles from 
the Cooperative Housing Bulletin and Cooperative Housing Journal, National Association of Housing 
Cooperatives (undated).  
20 Thomas J. Miceli, Gerald W. Sazama, and C.F. Sirmans, “The Role of Limited-Equity Cooperatives in 
Providing Affordable Housing,” Housing Policy Debate, The Fannie Mae Foundation, V. 5, Issue 4, 1994, 
479 (www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd.shtml), and Gerald Sazama and Roger Wilcox, “An 
Evaluation of Limited Equity Housing Cooperatives in the United States,” University of Connecticut, 
Department of Economics Working Paper Series, Working Paper 1995-02, 1995, 26 
(www.econ.uconn.edu) 
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  Long-term maintenance of residential buildings is subject to a host of local, state, 
and federal government regulations. A replacement reserve account is established as a 
source of funding long-term maintenance in underwriting 515 or any other multifamily 
housing project. The standard RHS policy for setting-up a reserve is to make deposits of 
1% of the total development cost until a 10% amount is reached, but recent revisions 
specify other adjustments in this amount to be based on life-cycle or special appraisals.
21 
  Yet, for all the regulations on long-term maintenance, the recent property 
assessment of the 515 portfolio reports that, “No property has sufficient current reserves, 
or provision for future reserves, to address physical needs over time.” 
22 This report also 
notes a general condition of deferred maintenance in these buildings. The encumbrance 
of property rights by limiting equity returns renders this outcome inevitable. As observed 
by the executive director of the trade association of section 515 for-profit developers, 
“With a limited return on equity, this limits the owner’s ability to maintain the property 
sufficiently.” 
23 From a property rights perspective, there is no compelling reason to 
expect different results with LEC ownership of a 515 property other than under the 
special conditions of having a significant majority of members who are committed to 
long-term residency.  
  A housing cooperative board of directors is responsible for planning and 
budgeting. Its decision-making has considerable discretion in the timing, extensiveness, 
and quality of long-term maintenance. Members not only elect the board, but also have 
some influence on their decisions. Members, especially those not considering long-term 
residence at the cooperative, may influence a policy of accomplishing some of the low 
carrying charges by means of deferred long-term building maintenance. In this way, a 
collective horizon problem is created. The horizon issue has been raised by economists, 
with some evidence in a 1992 Canadian study that cooperatives deferred long-term 
maintenance. Note that the authors who referenced this study believe that deferred 
maintenance is not typical of LECs.
24  Yet again, problems with deferred maintenance by 
LECs in Illinois have been reported by a HUD official.
25   
  The opportunity for member equity appreciation is an economic incentive that 
would contribute to solving the horizon problem of inadequate long-term maintenance. 
Solving this problem contributes to the supply of affordable housing even if some of the 
preserved supply were to become less affordable from a rise in price of new member 
shares.  An MRC policy can be applied in rural areas because only modest increases in 
the value of shares are likely to occur but at the same time be sufficient to create 
incentives for long-term maintenance.  Long-run savings for the government in physical 
preservation of buildings could then be allocated to help the very lowest income families 
with their housing affordability problems. A new cycle would begin but it would be 
upward in terms of improving the quality of housing, rather than the downward cycle of 
deteriorating properties with current policies. 
 
                                                           
21 Asset Management Handbook, HB-2-3560, USDA/Rural Housing Service, Chapter 4, 4-13 
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22  Property Assessment, 4. 
23 HAC, 18. 
24 Sazama and Willcox, op cit, 27 and 46. 
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Equity Appreciation as a Savings Mechanism 
  Another advantage of using cooperative equity as an incentive to improve housing 
is to create a starting point for low-income families to accumulate wealth. This view has 
been advocated for over a decade or more as a way of transitioning low-income families 
to unsubsidized homeownership.
26 
  The argument for returns on equity has never had traction among housing 
cooperative advocates and such returns are prohibited in 515 regulations because they 
conflict with affordability policies. Furthermore, it is argued that financial benefits for                                     
members occur in the form of lower monthly carrying charges as compared to amounts 
paid by rental tenants. Proponents of LECs point out that this source of personal savings 
offsets the restrictions on member equity appreciation.
27  The evidence for lower carrying 
charges is briefly reviewed before discussing why equity is a better method of personal 
savings than low carrying charges. 
  A major source of savings in carrying charges is the blanket mortgage used by 
cooperatives, in contrast to individual loan financing of condominium units or single-
family homes. Each time one of these latter properties changes ownership, new loans are 
made and a series of expensive real estate transactions occur. In contrast, membership 
turnover in a cooperative avoids these tremendous costs because no real estate is bought 
and sold. There is only a transaction in transferring a membership share. Rental tenants 
also incur a similar source of escalating costs from frequent changes in the ownership of 
apartment buildings.
28  Member turnover in cooperatives only affects a small part of the 
shares and the mortgage is unaffected. In regard to mortgage payments, LEC members 
who would be subject to Federal income taxes may deduct their share of interest 
payments. 
  Another source of reduced costs is in daily operations and the care of common 
areas of apartments. Cooperative members have more incentives for daily up-keep of 
properties, especially commons areas because their actions can help reduce carrying 
charges. Evidence for these efficiencies are found in comparative studies with other 
forms of subsidized housing where mortgage costs would be similar. In a study 
completed in 2003, the Co-operative Housing Federation of Canada compared the 
operating costs of LECs for low income families with those of other municipal or private 
non-profit housing. In this study, LECs cost 14% less to operate than other institutions 
that provide low-income housing.
29 
  Efficient operations of housing cooperatives can accomplish both low carrying 
charges and long-term maintenance without requiring trade-offs between the two. Yet, as 
pointed out in the previous section, some LECs have been known to defer long-term 
maintenance. The potential trade-off raises the point that even when carrying charges can 
be lowered without short-changing long-term maintenance, there are alternative 
opportunities to use the savings in operating costs for capital improvements rather than 
distribute them in lower carrying charges.  
                                                           
26 Miceli, Sazama, and Sirmans, op cit, 479. 
27 Enterprise Foundation, “Alternative Financing Models – Hybrids of Homeownership, Limited-Equity 
Cooperative Housing (www.enterprisefoundation.org/resources/dss/large/lg&rin&rnc&ucpsff3.htm), and 
Susan Saegert and Lymari Benitez, “Limited Equity Housing Cooperatives, A Review of the Literature,” 
City University of New York Graduate Center & the Taconic Foundation, June 2003, 7. 
28 David H. Kirkpatrick, “Legal Issues in the Development of Housing Cooperatives,” National Economic 
Development & Law Center (Berkeley, CA) 1981, 21. 
29 Co-operative Housing Federation of Canada,  just the numbers (www.chfc.ca/eng/chf/about_1_2.htm).   11
  Recent research in behavioral economics has bolstered the arguments in favor of 
housing equity as a means of increased personal savings. Since members of a housing 
cooperative can use share loans to spend their equity, that which remains unspent is 
savings. There are many alternative ways to create savings, but behavioral economists 
have tested and rejected the proposition that the amount a rational individual chooses to 
save is invariant with respect to different forms of savings used. In the words of Shefrin 
and Thaler: “If the wealth in their home is a good substitute for other savings, then one 
would expect homeowners to have less savings in other assets, holding everything else 
constant. However, just the opposite is true.” From survey data, those with the largest 
amounts of savings in the form of home equity also held more in other kinds of savings 
as compared to other individuals with comparable wealth and income.
30  
  Some of the increased savings is caused by the fact that home equity is not a 
perfect substitute in terms of access. Member equity in a housing cooperative is not as 
readily spent as is the increased revenues available each month to members from lower 
carrying charges.   
  In a property rights analysis, personal savings failures are an individual horizon 
problem in contrast to the “collective” horizon problem of deferred maintenance in 
multifamily housing.  Cooperative housing, with a policy that pays returns on member 
equity, would contribute to remedying both types of horizon problem.  
  The economics of property rights have been applied to redesign the traditional 
model of farmer cooperatives into the new generation cooperatives. Returns on member 
equity are generated by transferable delivery rights in a closed cooperative. In contrast, 
savings on inputs or premiums on marketing products are the user-benefits of traditional 
farmer cooperatives.  
  Behavioral economists’ analysis of savings is applicable to a comparison of 
earnings from delivery rights with the same business operations organized as a traditional 
cooperative with annual distribution of earnings. Research has shown that members 
significantly invest more in new generation cooperatives than is by comparison invested 
by members of traditional cooperatives.
31 Although not tested, similar behavior is 
expected in the case of housing LECs, where the gains for members of lower carrying 
charges are spent rather than retained for investment in their cooperative.  
 
Implementing 515 MRCs 
  Ownership transfers of many of the 515 multifamily housing properties to 
cooperatives is economically infeasible without several major coordination and re-
structuring steps. The problem of exit taxes was discussed earlier, and that problem in 
part reflects the more general weakness of insufficient equity for financing significant 
rehabilitations that would predictably be needed.   
  Part of the financial obstacles for ownership transfers is the relative small size of 
515 properties and their geographic dispersion. The average size of a property was 27 
units in 2001, and many of them are separately owned by small property developers.
32 In 
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other words, the per-unit cost of transfer is high and a solution lies in achieving 
economies by bundling several properties into a single re-development process.
33 
  An innovative plan for financing 515 transfers to a “quasi-cooperative” form has 
been developed by Cooperative Community Works (CCW), a subsidiary of the NCB. The 
term “quasi” is used in this paper because membership rights and benefits are, by 
financial necessity, compromised in comparison to the model of a single, stand-alone 
housing cooperative, whether organized as an LEC or MRC.   The CCW have adapted 
the system of mutual housing associations (MHAs) that are prevalent in some of the 
European countries.
34 An MHA can accomplish the bundling of several separately owned 
515 properties for a new, consolidated ownership that can finance rehabilitation. 
  In the CCW plan, an MHA is organized as a 501(c)(3) non-profit. Since the 
bundling of properties would not cross state lines because of many distinctive regulations 
in the state offices of RHS, it is feasible to fund some of the rehabilitation with proceeds 
from the issuing of tax-exempt state bonds. Furthermore, an MHA can establish 
partnerships for syndicating tax credits for retiring the bonds after completion of 
rehabilitation. Additional new financing would be accessed and under recent regulatory 
change, the 515 loans can be subordinated. 
35  
  Ownership would initially be shared by members of the tax credit partnership for 
a 15-year period, after which the housing properties would be exclusively held by the 
MHA. Residents would be members of the MHA with occupancy rights but without 
equity. After initial rehabilitation and its financing are completed, sole ownership would 
transfer to the MHA, and members would elect a board of directors.
36  From that point 
on, it would seem to be feasible to revise the by-laws to provide for a financial return to 
members as might exist in the future market value of a share. Such gain in value would 
be based in part on improvements to the property subsequent to the rehabilitation that 
could be attributed to the efforts of members. 
  Members of MHAs are not as cohesive and community oriented as members of a 
local, single property ownership, housing cooperative. In fact, in the European experience 
there are frequent tensions and disagreements over cooperative policies between the 
members in different geographic locations.
37  Once ownership has been transferred to an 
MHA, more individual assignment of rights to each member would improve the care of 
properties. Given the potential for weaker member cohesiveness in MHAs, a LEC policy 
would result in members continuing to regard themselves as tenants who are occasionally 
asked to vote for a slate of candidates to the board. In other words, MRC policy of 
allowing members to transfer their shares at the market rate can compensate for weaker 
cohesiveness in accomplishing long-term maintenance and improvement of properties.   
  Whether developing a 515 MRC down the long road of an MHA or in a local 
housing cooperative, a few regulatory constraints would help accomplish a balanced 
trade-off between affordability and long-term care of property. These constraints would 
have to be studied and tested in pilot projects, and probably revised overtime. Three 
general restrictions are suggested:   
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1.  Members would not have the right to dissolve a 515 housing cooperative, or 
 otherwise  sell-out  as  a group to a developer. 
2.  A waiting period of 3-5 years or more would be established before departing 
  members may receive an equity return on sales of their shares. 
3.  Departing members who receive rent subsidies would have the equity return on 
  sales of their shares reduced to an extent that would try to minimize reduction of 
  incentives to maintain and improve property. But a reduction in their return is 
  justified as a pay-back for part of their past rent subsidies. 
 
   Restriction 1 would interfere with a members’ pursuit of personal savings or 
wealth, but is justified on the grounds that public revenue was spent on these projects to 
accomplish affordable housing for current and future low-income families. The right of 
cooperative dissolutions and property sell-outs cannot be allowed because it would result 
in conversions to higher-priced housing that would be out of range for those intended to 
be served by affordability policy. 
  Restriction 2 was developed and applied to a non-515 conversion in Minnesota by 
a housing cooperative specialist with the Northcountry Cooperative Development Fund.
38  
Northcountry has advocated a form of restricted MRC to be used in 515 ownership 
transfers as a necessary membership incentive for these projects to succeed. They have 
also communicated these concerns to RHS and the importance of revising many of the 
515 program regulations that prohibit returns on member equity.  As mentioned earlier, 
this and other issues that undermine cooperatives were identified in the 1999 study of the 
515 program.  
  Restriction 3 touches several sensitive and complex topics. About 300,000 units 
in the 515 portfolio have rental subsidies, either RHS section 521 or HUD section 8. The 
Rent subsidies protect tenants from paying more than 30 percent of their income for 
housing. Those receiving the subsidy cover a range of income differences, with those at 
the lowest level having only the subsidy to use for rent payments. Many of the 515 
properties have a mix of tenants with and without rent subsidies.  
  The amount of reduction in the return paid to rent-subsidized members for their 
shares in the housing cooperatives, should they depart, would lessen, but should not 
eliminate, incentives for property up-keep. Restriction 3 would effectively make some 
housing cooperatives have members under both an MRC and an LEC status. The 
prediction of property rights economics is that the more members in MRC status, the 
greater will be future improvements in the multifamily housing buildings and grounds.  
 
Cooperatives and Property Rights 
  Cooperatives can be viewed as organizations for alternative re-bundling and 
assigning of rights to specific attributes of property. They can accomplish a more 
balanced trade-off between housing affordability and long-term incentives to maintain 
and improve property than any of the current methods of ownership and participation in 
the 515 program. 
  In a transfer of 515 multifamily housing to cooperatives, a part of the bundle of 
rights is assigned to tenants. Members of housing cooperatives receive a much stronger 
right of occupancy that offers far more protection from eviction than is held by rental 
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tenants. In regard to LECs, they are designed to also produce a local public good of 
housing affordability. The first entrants or members are restricted from capturing real 
estate profits when they sell their shares. In much of urban and suburban U.S., housing 
affordability has recently been under severe stress from a large escalation of prices. An 
MRC in such markets would eventually sacrifice affordability policy.   
  Affordability is also a problem in rural areas of the U.S. and the available stock of 
515 multifamily housing needs to be preserved. While such preservation has been under 
pressure from loan prepayments that have lead to conversions into higher priced housing, 
a looming threat is the gradual physical deterioration of buildings that have lacked a 
property rights system to ensure their proper long-term maintenance. Cooperatives, with 
their capability to distribute specific rights to large groups of individuals, can inject 
incentives for long-term maintenance into 515 properties.  
  The model of a restricted MRC, operating in rural real estate markets, can 
accomplish an effective trade-off between affordability and property preservation. Any 
declines in affordability due to implementing this policy in rural real estate markets 
would be predictably slight and spread-out over time. More important, declines in 
affordability would be off-set by creating conditions for low-income families to achieve 
modest increases in wealth, and by more prevention of physical deterioration of relatively 
low-priced multifamily housing.  